A Revolutionary Reexamination of the Historical Buddha’s Original Teaching
Abstract
This investigation presents compelling evidence that Siddhāttha Gotama, the historical Buddha, was fundamentally a naturalistic philosopher who developed systematic methods for eliminating psychological suffering through rational understanding of human nature. The central claim—that “liberation” (nibbāna) represented psychological peace achieved through accepting mortality and recognizing the absence of a permanent self—stands in stark contrast to the received religious interpretation emphasizing escape from rebirth through karmic purification. Through rigorous textual stratification analysis, comparative philosophical investigation, and historical contextualization, this study demonstrates that the earliest Buddhist strata preserve naturalistic teachings that were progressively overlaid with religious frameworks to meet institutional and popular needs. The implications extend far beyond Buddhist studies, potentially revolutionizing our understanding of Axial Age philosophical development and providing historical legitimacy for contemporary secular approaches to contemplative practice.
Introduction: The Revolutionary Hypothesis
In the quiet groves outside Sāvatthī, twenty-five centuries ago, a wandering philosopher engaged in systematic dialogue with students about the nature of suffering, death, and human psychological liberation. The questions were precise, the methodology empirical, the conclusions radical. “Like a flame blown out by wind,” he explained to Upasīva, the liberated person “goes to rest and comes not to reckoning.”[1] No metaphysical speculation about post-mortem states, no promises of eternal continuation—simply the natural cessation that comes to all conditioned phenomena.
This image, preserved in what scholars recognize as among the earliest Buddhist poetry, presents a figure strikingly different from the religious teacher of later tradition. Rather than founding a system of cosmic salvation, this teacher appears to have developed sophisticated naturalistic methods for achieving psychological peace through rational acceptance of mortality and the groundlessness of personal identity. The revolutionary hypothesis explored in this investigation is that this naturalistic philosopher—not the religious savior of institutional Buddhism—represents the historical Buddha whose original teachings were progressively reinterpreted through religious frameworks that obscured their empirical, therapeutic foundation.
The stakes of this inquiry extend far beyond academic historical revision. If the evidence supports a naturalistic interpretation, it would fundamentally reorient Buddhist studies while providing historical legitimacy for secular contemplative approaches that have emerged independently across cultures. More broadly, it would contribute to our understanding of how sophisticated philosophical positions become transformed into religious systems, offering insights into the development of human intellectual traditions during the crucial Axial Age period when rational philosophy first challenged traditional religious authority across multiple cultures.
The methodological challenge is formidable. The temporal gap between the proposed historical figure (c. 480-400 BCE) and our earliest complete textual sources (c. 100 BCE-100 CE) has led traditional scholarship to focus primarily on received canonical material without systematic attempts to distinguish historical from interpretive layers. This investigation employs convergent evidence from textual criticism, comparative philosophy, and historical analysis to transcend the limitations of any single approach. The cumulative case, while necessarily inferential, proves remarkably compelling when multiple independent methodologies point toward consistent conclusions.
Part I: The Earliest Textual Strata and Their Naturalistic Content
The Aṭṭhakavagga: Pure Philosophy Without Religious Overlay
Among the treasures of early Buddhist literature, the Aṭṭhakavagga (Suttanipāta verses 766-975) stands apart for its linguistic archaisms and philosophical sophistication. K.R. Norman, the preeminent Pali scholar, has argued for its exceptional antiquity based on metrical and linguistic analysis.[2] What emerges from systematic content analysis, however, proves even more significant: this collection preserves naturalistic philosophy virtually free from the religious elements that characterize later Buddhist texts.
The philosophical vocabulary employed throughout these verses describes psychological processes in naturalistic terms rather than religious categories. Consider the opening lines of the Guhaṭṭhaka Sutta: “Kāmesu vinaya gedhaṃ, nekkhammaṃ daṭṭhu khemato, mā te vijjittha kiñci vā ādānaṃ vā vimutti vā”—”Remove greed regarding pleasures, see renunciation as security; let there be found in you neither grasping nor release.”[3] The terminology here—gedhaṃ (greed), nekkhammaṃ (renunciation), khemato (security)—describes natural psychological states and strategies rather than religious virtues or spiritual attainments. The paradoxical instruction to seek neither grasping nor release suggests a sophisticated philosophical position transcending conventional religious categories of bondage and liberation.
This naturalistic approach becomes even more explicit in the Paramaṭṭhaka Sutta’s analysis of psychological becoming: “Yassa natthi idhaṃ vā huraṃ vā ubhayaṃ vā kāmabhavaṃ”—”For whom there is neither here nor there nor both—no becoming through desire.”[4] The concept of kāmabhava (becoming through desire) represents a remarkably sophisticated analysis of how psychological identification creates suffering, yet it requires no metaphysical commitments about realms or rebirths. The teaching operates purely at the level of observable mental processes.
Perhaps most significantly, the Aṭṭhakavagga demonstrates systematic rejection of metaphysical positions rather than advancing alternative religious doctrines. The Pasūra Sutta declares: “Diṭṭhiṃ pana brahme na upādiyāno, na hi tāsu balavā hoti vādo”—”Not grasping any view, brahmin, for thus there is no strong argumentation about them.”[5] This represents not agnosticism but a more sophisticated recognition that metaphysical speculation itself proves counterproductive to psychological well-being. The following verse reinforces this anti-metaphysical stance: “Diṭṭhīsu na jhāyāmi, na ca adhimuttiko”—”I do not meditate on views, nor am I strongly attached [to them].”[6] The Buddha’s position transcends both theistic and atheistic commitments through rational recognition that such speculation distracts from practical psychological work.
The ethical framework emerging from these verses operates without supernatural foundations. The Salla Sutta’s treatment of death exemplifies this naturalistic approach: “Aniccā vata saṅkhārā, uppādavayadhammino”—”Impermanent indeed are formations, subject to arising and passing away.”[7] Impermanence appears here not as religious doctrine requiring faith but as empirical observation accessible through rational investigation. The verse continues with practical psychological advice: “Etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho”—”This is peaceful, this is sublime: the stilling of all formations.”[8] Liberation emerges through natural recognition rather than supernatural intervention.
Critically, these earliest verses contain no references to karma, rebirth, or cosmological frameworks that dominate later Buddhist texts. The absence proves particularly striking given how fundamental these concepts became to institutional Buddhism. When the Aṭṭhakavagga addresses ethical behavior, it grounds recommendations in natural consequences rather than karmic mechanisms. The Māgandiya Sutta’s approach to sensual pleasure exemplifies this naturalistic ethics: the teaching focuses on how attachment creates psychological suffering rather than invoking karmic consequences or rebirth implications.[9]
The Pārāyanavagga: Systematic Philosophical Dialogue
The Pārāyanavagga (Suttanipāta verses 1032-1149) provides even more explicit evidence for naturalistic philosophical methodology through its systematic dialogue format. These conversations between the Buddha and various questioners reveal a sophisticated teacher employing rational discourse rather than authoritative pronouncement to address fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge, death, and liberation.
The epistemological framework emerging from these dialogues represents pure philosophical naturalism. Nanda’s famous question receives a response that systematically eliminates conventional sources of authority: “Na diṭṭhiyā na sutiyā na ñāṇena, munīdha nanda kusalā vadanti”—”Not by view, not by learning, not by knowledge do the wise here call one a sage.”[10] This remarkable statement rejects three fundamental sources of religious and philosophical authority: inherited views (diṭṭhiyā), scriptural learning (sutiyā), and conventional knowledge (ñāṇena). The verse continues: “Visenikatvā anīghā nirāsā, caranti ye te munayoti brūmi”—”Those who wander without possessions, untroubled, without expectations—them I call sages.”[11] Wisdom emerges not through external validation but through a natural state of non-attachment that can be verified through direct experience.
The treatment of death throughout these dialogues proves equally naturalistic. When Upasīva presses for details about the fate of the liberated person after death, the Buddha consistently employs natural analogies rather than metaphysical descriptions. The famous flame metaphor appears in this context: “Accī yathā vātavegena khittā, atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ”—”Like a flame blown out by wind, goes to rest and comes not to reckoning.”[12] The following verse elaborates: “Evam munī nāmakāyā vimutto, atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ”—”So the sage freed from name and form goes to rest and comes not to reckoning.”[13]
The phrase “na upeti saṅkhaṃ” proves particularly significant, as saṅkhaṃ refers to numerical reckoning or categorical designation. The liberated person cannot be counted among the living or dead, existent or non-existent, because such categories prove inadequate for describing natural processes that have reached completion. This sophisticated position avoids both eternalist claims (the person continues existing) and annihilationist claims (the person is destroyed) by recognizing that personal identity itself represents a conceptual construction rather than an ultimate reality requiring ontological preservation or destruction.
When Upasīva persists with questions about post-mortem states—”Atthaṅgato so uda vā so natthi, udāhu ve sassatiyā arogo”—”Has he perished or does he not exist, or is he eternally free from dis-ease?”—the Buddha’s response maintains naturalistic restraint: “Atthaṅgatassa na pamāṇamatthi, yena naṃ vajju taṃ tassa natthi”—”For one who has gone to rest there is no measure by which one might speak of him; that by which one might define him exists not.”[14] This represents not mystical ineffability but rational recognition that conceptual frameworks adequate for describing ongoing processes prove inappropriate for describing their natural completion.
The systematic rejection of religious purification systems throughout these dialogues provides perhaps the most compelling evidence for the naturalistic interpretation. The Buddha’s response to questions about various purification methods proves comprehensive: “Ye kecime samaṇabrāhmaṇāse, diṭṭhassutenāpi vadanti suddhiṃ, sīlabbatenāpi vadanti suddhiṃ, anekarūpena vadanti suddhiṃ”—”Whatever ascetics and brahmins say purification comes by what is seen and heard, by rites and observances, by various forms.”[15] The rejection proves systematic rather than selective: “Ye sīdha diṭṭhaṃ va sutaṃ mutaṃ vā, sīlabbataṃ vāpi pahāya sabbaṃ”—”Having abandoned all—what is seen, heard, thought, rites and observances.”[16] The phrase “pahāya sabbaṃ” (abandoning all) leaves no exceptions for supposedly beneficial religious practices. Purification occurs through psychological understanding rather than ceremonial action.
This comprehensive rejection of ritual systems aligns perfectly with the broader Axial Age critique of traditional religious authority occurring simultaneously in Greece, China, and other Indo-European cultures. However, the Buddha’s position proves more systematic than most contemporary philosophical approaches. Rather than reforming existing religious practices or substituting alternative supernatural systems, these dialogues point toward purely naturalistic foundations for ethics and liberation.
Textual Stratification: The Evolution from Philosophy to Religion
The most compelling evidence for the naturalistic interpretation emerges from systematic analysis of how karma and rebirth terminology distributes across Buddhist texts. This investigation reveals a striking pattern: the concepts central to later religious Buddhism appear entirely absent from the earliest textual strata while becoming increasingly prominent in subsequent layers.
The Aṭṭhakavagga (verses 766-975) contains zero references to punabbhava (re-becoming), kamma-vipāka (karma and results), jāti (birth in the sense of rebirth), or cosmological realms. This absence proves particularly remarkable given how fundamental these concepts became to institutional Buddhism. When these verses address ethical behavior and its consequences, they focus entirely on present-life psychological effects rather than future-life implications.
The Pārāyanavagga core dialogues (verses 1032-1149) maintain this pattern, with the Buddha consistently redirecting metaphysical questions toward present-moment psychological analysis. When asked about purification, the focus remains on abandoning mental attachments rather than accumulating karmic merit. When questioned about post-mortem states, natural analogies replace rebirth descriptions.
However, later sections of the Suttanipāta reveal systematic integration of karma and rebirth concepts. Verse 735 in the Hemavata Sutta declares: “Sammadaññāya te satā, na te gacchanti punabbhavaṃ”—”Having rightly understood, those beings do not go to re-becoming.”[17] Verse 748 reinforces this theme: “Jātikkhayam abhiññāya, na gacchanti punabbhavaṃ”—”Having directly known the destruction of birth, they do not go to re-becoming.”[18] Verse 759 describes the opposite condition: “Nirodhaṃ appajānantā, āgantāro punabbhavaṃ”—”Not understanding cessation, they come to re-becoming.”[19]
This distribution pattern strongly suggests historical stratification rather than thematic variation. If karma and rebirth represented original teachings, their complete absence from the earliest verses would prove inexplicable. The systematic appearance of this terminology in later sections, by contrast, aligns with historical processes of religious development where original philosophical teachings become integrated with popular religious expectations.
Linguistic analysis supports this stratification hypothesis. The earliest verses preserve archaic Pali features and natural imagery predominating over technical terminology. Later sections demonstrate increasing systematization of vocabulary, formulaic repetition patterns characteristic of institutional transmission, and integration of cosmological elements with ethical teaching. The Ratana Sutta’s blessing formulas (“Etena saccavajjena, sotthi te hotu sabbadā”—”By this declaration of truth, may you always be well”)[20] exemplify this institutional language absent from the philosophical dialogues.
The progression proves even more evident when examining canonical collections beyond the Suttanipāta. Early suttas in the Majjhima and Dīgha Nikāyas often preserve sophisticated philosophical analysis, but later additions systematically integrate karma and rebirth as explanatory frameworks. The Abhidhamma literature represents the culmination of this process, providing technical systematization of concepts that appear to have developed gradually rather than representing original teachings.
This textual evolution parallels documented historical processes in other religious traditions. The Hebrew Bible preserves naturalistic wisdom literature (Ecclesiastes, parts of Proverbs) alongside later theological material emphasizing divine intervention and afterlife speculation. Early Greek philosophy emerges from naturalistic observation before becoming integrated with religious and mystical elements in later Neoplatonism. The pattern suggests that sophisticated naturalistic philosophy often becomes interpreted through religious frameworks when transmitted to broader communities seeking conventional religious consolation.
Part II: Historical Context and Cross-Cultural Parallels
The Axial Age Revolution in Rational Philosophy
The Buddha’s proposed naturalistic position becomes comprehensible only when situated within the broader intellectual revolution occurring across multiple cultures during the Axial Age (c. 800-200 BCE). This period witnessed the simultaneous emergence of rational philosophy in Greece, China, Israel, and India—a phenomenon so remarkable that Karl Jaspers termed it the “Axial Age” for its pivotal role in human intellectual development.[21] Rather than representing isolated religious innovation, the naturalistic Buddha emerges as part of this cross-cultural rational awakening.
The parallels with contemporary Greek philosophy prove particularly striking. Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475 BCE), working within decades of the Buddha’s proposed lifetime, developed remarkably similar insights about impermanence and natural law. His famous doctrine “πάντα ῥεῖ” (panta rhei—everything flows) corresponds closely to the Buddhist insight “sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā” (all formations are impermanent).[22] Both teachers recognized impermanence not as religious doctrine but as fundamental characteristic of natural reality accessible through rational observation.
More significantly, both developed sophisticated approaches to death anxiety that transcend conventional religious consolations. Heraclitus’s paradoxical statement “ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι” (athanatoi thnētoi, thnētoi athanatoi—immortals are mortal, mortals are immortal)[23] explores the relationship between individual identity and natural processes in ways that remarkably prefigure the Buddha’s flame metaphor. Neither teacher promises personal survival; both point toward ways of understanding mortality that eliminate death anxiety through rational acceptance rather than supernatural hope.
The methodological parallels prove equally significant. Heraclitus emphasized direct investigation over received tradition: “The things of which there is seeing and hearing and perception, these do I prefer.”[24] This empirical approach parallels the Buddha’s emphasis on “sandiṭṭhikam akālikaṃ” (visible here-and-now, not a matter of time)[25] as the criterion for valid teaching. Both philosophers developed systematic critiques of conventional religious authority while maintaining that wisdom emerges through individual investigation of natural processes.
Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-370 BCE) provides even more remarkable parallels, particularly in psychological theory. His atomic materialism led to sophisticated analysis of mental processes without requiring permanent soul-concepts. “νόμωι γλυκύ, νόμωι πικρόν, νόμωι θερμόν, νόμωι ψυχρόν, νόμωι χροιή· ἐτεῆι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν” (nomōi glyku, nomōi pikron—conventionally sweet, conventionally bitter, conventionally hot, conventionally cold, conventionally colored; in reality, atoms and void).[26] This analysis of conventional vs. ultimate reality closely parallels Buddhist analysis of nāma-rūpa (name-and-form) as conceptual construction overlaying natural processes.
Democritus developed naturalistic ethics without supernatural foundations: happiness emerged through rational understanding rather than divine favor or ritual purification. His approach to death—viewing it as natural dissolution rather than transition to afterlife—aligns closely with the Buddha’s flame metaphor. Both philosophers recognized that death anxiety represents the primary source of psychological suffering and developed rational methods for achieving peace through accepting mortality rather than denying it through religious speculation.
The early Stoic philosophers provide perhaps the closest methodological parallels to naturalistic Buddhism. Their fundamental principle “κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν” (kata phusin zēn—live according to nature)[27] corresponds to following natural dharma without supernatural intervention. Stoic emphasis on rational therapy for psychological suffering—particularly their systematic analysis of how false judgments create emotional disturbance—parallels Buddhist psychology as natural healing method.
The Stoic approach to death proves particularly relevant. Rather than promising survival, they developed rational exercises for achieving peace through mortality acceptance. Epictetus taught: “You are nothing but a small tragedy, for you are what you are only for a short time.”[28] This naturalistic acceptance, combined with systematic training in non-attachment to external conditions, provides a Greek parallel to Buddhist liberation through understanding impermanence and not-self.
These extensive parallels cannot represent mere coincidence. The Axial Age witnessed systematic emergence of rational philosophy across multiple cultures, suggesting either shared cultural transmission or independent recognition of similar insights about human psychology and natural reality. The Buddha’s naturalistic position fits perfectly within this intellectual context while representing one of its most sophisticated expressions.
Indo-European Philosophical Heritage and Cultural Exchange
The philosophical parallels between naturalistic Buddhism and contemporary Greek thought become even more comprehensible when considered within the context of Indo-European linguistic and cultural heritage. Modern comparative linguistics has demonstrated that Sanskrit and Greek derive from common Proto-Indo-European roots, suggesting shared conceptual frameworks that could facilitate translation of complex philosophical ideas across cultures.[29]
The fundamental philosophical vocabulary demonstrates this shared heritage. The Proto-Indo-European root *h₁reǵ- (rule, order) appears in Greek ἀρχή (arkhē—principle, rule) and Sanskrit ṛta (cosmic order), evolving into Pali dhamma as natural law governing mental and physical processes.[30] Significantly, all three concepts originally described natural order rather than divine command, suggesting that naturalistic interpretation represents preservation of original meaning rather than secular innovation.
The epistemological vocabulary reveals similar patterns. Proto-Indo-European *ǵʰneh₃- (to know) yields Greek γνῶσις (gnōsis—knowledge through direct experience) and Sanskrit jñāna, appearing in Pali as ñāṇa.[31] The emphasis on direct experiential knowledge rather than revealed or inferential knowledge appears across multiple Indo-European philosophical traditions, suggesting shared methodological heritage rather than independent innovation.
Archaeological evidence supports extensive cultural exchange networks during the Buddha’s lifetime. The Persian Empire under Cyrus and Darius facilitated trade and intellectual contact between the Greek cities, Mesopotamian centers, and Indian kingdoms. The famous Behistun inscription demonstrates Persian administrative sophistication enabling communication across vast territories and diverse languages.[32] Elite intellectuals could travel these networks, carrying philosophical ideas between cultures.
The city of Taxila, located in present-day Pakistan, served as a crucial intellectual center connecting Indian and Persian cultural spheres. Pāṇini’s Sanskrit grammatical analysis (c. 520-460 BCE) demonstrates sophisticated linguistic analysis occurring contemporaneously with the Buddha’s proposed teaching activity.[33] Such intellectual sophistication required educational institutions and cultural exchange networks capable of supporting advanced philosophical dialogue.
More directly, the Majjhima Nikāya preserves accounts of the Buddha’s interactions with followers of various philosophical schools, including those holding materialist positions.[34] These dialogues suggest a sophisticated intellectual environment where competing philosophical approaches engaged in systematic debate rather than isolated religious proclamation. The Buddha’s position emerges from this context of rational dialogue rather than ex nihilo religious revelation.
The Suttanipāta itself preserves evidence of cultural sophistication. The Nālaka Sutta describes the young bodhisatta’s educational achievements: “sabbakammavisārado, sabbavijjāsu kovidaṃ”—”skilled in all arts, expert in all knowledge.”[35] While this passage appears in later material, it reflects traditions recognizing broad intellectual preparation rather than narrowly religious focus. Such education would naturally include familiarity with contemporary philosophical developments across cultural boundaries.
The sophistication of early Buddhist psychology provides additional evidence for cross-cultural intellectual engagement. The systematic analysis of mental factors (cetasikas), consciousness processes (vijñāna-skandhas), and contemplative methodologies demonstrates familiarity with advanced psychological investigation that parallels developments in other Axial Age cultures. Such sophistication emerges through intellectual exchange rather than isolated insight.
Contemporary Indian Philosophical Context
The Buddha’s naturalistic position becomes even more comprehensible when situated within the diverse śramaṇa movement that emerged in the Ganges valley during the 6th-5th centuries BCE. This intellectual renaissance included numerous non-brahmanical philosophical schools developing systematic alternatives to Vedic religious authority. Rather than representing unique religious innovation, the Buddha appears to have contributed the most sophisticated naturalistic position within this broader rational movement.
The Sāmaññaphala Sutta preserves descriptions of various contemporary philosophical positions, including several that demonstrate naturalistic elements.[36] Ajita Kesakambalin’s materialist position held that “cātumahabūtiko ayaṃ puriso”—”this person consists of the four great elements,” and “kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṃ maraṇā”—”with the dissolution of the body, he is cut off and destroyed; he does not exist after death.”[37] While this position lacks the psychological sophistication of the Buddha’s analysis, it demonstrates that naturalistic approaches to death and personal identity were actively debated rather than representing isolated innovation.
The Dīgha Nikāya’s account of Pakudha Kaccāyana’s atomic theory provides another example of naturalistic philosophy: “satta me imā kāyā akaṭā”—”These seven substances of mine are not made [by anyone].”[38] His analysis of natural elements operating according to inherent principles rather than divine intervention parallels Greek atomic theory and suggests sophisticated understanding of natural causation emerging independently within Indian intellectual culture.
More significantly, these contemporary positions lacked the systematic psychological analysis that characterizes the Buddha’s approach. Materialist schools typically focused on metaphysical questions about ultimate reality rather than developing practical methods for psychological liberation. The Buddha’s distinctive contribution appears to have been synthesizing naturalistic metaphysics with sophisticated therapeutic psychology, creating a philosophical system capable of addressing both intellectual and practical human needs.
The broader śramaṇa movement shared several characteristics that align with Axial Age rational developments: systematic critique of traditional brahmanical authority, emphasis on individual investigation over inherited social-religious roles, urban mercantile patronage rather than traditional aristocratic support, and rational methodology competing with traditional religious revelation. The Buddha’s position emerges as the most sophisticated expression of these shared intellectual tendencies rather than representing supernatural religious innovation.
The Jain tradition, probably contemporary with early Buddhism, demonstrates similar elements while maintaining different emphases. Jain analysis of karmic mechanisms operates more naturalistically than later Buddhist karma doctrine, focusing on physical processes of karmic matter rather than moral desert systems.[39] The Jain emphasis on detailed analysis of mental and physical processes parallels Buddhist psychology while maintaining different theoretical frameworks. These similarities suggest shared intellectual context rather than mutual influence or common religious inspiration.
The Upaniṣadic literature, representing the philosophical development within brahmanical tradition, demonstrates similar movement toward rational analysis during this period. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s sophisticated psychological analysis and the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad’s epistemological investigations parallel Buddhist developments while maintaining different conclusions.[40] The intellectual sophistication emerging across multiple traditions suggests a broader cultural movement toward rational philosophy rather than isolated religious developments.
Archaeological evidence from this period supports the emergence of urban intellectual culture capable of supporting sophisticated philosophical activity. Excavations at sites like Kauśāmbī and Ujjayinī reveal substantial urban centers with evidence of literacy, craft specialization, and economic complexity.[41] Such urban environments provide the necessary conditions for professional philosophical activity and the patronage systems required for sustained intellectual development.
Part III: Contemporary Difficulties and the Problem of Understanding
Canonical Evidence for Teaching Difficulty
The canonical literature preserves extensive testimony that the Buddha’s teaching proved difficult for contemporaries to understand—evidence that supports the naturalistic interpretation while challenging conventional religious explanations. The Dīgha Nikāya’s systematic presentation of teaching difficulty provides particularly compelling evidence: “Atthi, bhikkhave, aññeva dhammā gambhīrā duddasā duranubodhā santā paṇītā atakkāvacarā nipuṇā paṇḍitavedanīyā, ye tathāgato sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti”—”There are, bhikkhus, other teachings that are deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful, sublime, beyond the range of logic, subtle, comprehensible only to the wise, which the Tathāgata, having realized them through direct knowledge, proclaims.”[42]
This passage requires careful analysis. The term “duddasā” (hard to see) suggests empirical difficulty—the teachings concern observable phenomena that require careful attention to perceive accurately. “Duranubodhā” (hard to understand) indicates intellectual challenge rather than mystical ineffability. “Atakkāvacarā” (beyond the range of logic) proves particularly significant, as it suggests that the teachings transcend ordinary logical categories rather than contradicting rational investigation. “Paṇḍitavedanīyā” (comprehensible only to the wise) indicates that understanding requires intellectual sophistication rather than faith or devotional surrender.
These characteristics align precisely with what we might expect from sophisticated naturalistic philosophy. The recognition that no permanent self exists despite strong psychological identification requires subtle phenomenological analysis beyond ordinary intellectual capacity. Death acceptance contradicts fundamental biological drives for survival and cultural narratives promising continued existence. Naturalistic ethics appears to eliminate moral foundations by rejecting both divine command and cosmic justice systems. Such teachings would naturally prove “hard to see” and “hard to understand” for audiences expecting conventional religious consolation.
The Majjhima Nikāya provides additional evidence for contemporary difficulty. The Nagaravindeyya Sutta describes various practitioners’ struggles: “Atha kho acirapakkantānaṃ tesaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ aññataro bhikkhu evaṃ cintesi: ‘kathaṃ nu kho mayaṃ imaṃ bhagavatā saṃkhittena ovādaṃ gahitaṃ vitthārena atthaṃ vibhajeyyāma'”—”Then, after those bhikkhus had left, one of them thought: ‘How should we analyze in detail the meaning of this brief instruction given by the Blessed One?'”[43] The struggle to understand “brief instructions” suggests that the Buddha’s teaching required sophisticated interpretation rather than simple acceptance.
The Cūḷasuññata Sutta preserves an even more revealing account of learning difficulty. Ānanda expresses concern about his ability to understand advanced teachings: “Sace me, bhante, bhagavā saṃkhittena dhammaṃ deseyya, app eva nāmahaṃ bhagavato bhāsitassa atthaṃ ājāneyyaṃ, app eva nāmassa bhagavato bhāsitassa dāyādo assan”—”If, sir, the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, perhaps I might understand the meaning of the Blessed One’s statement, perhaps I might be an heir to the Blessed One’s statement.”[44] This request comes from the Buddha’s primary attendant and closest disciple, suggesting that even intimate students struggled with the teaching’s sophistication.
Why Naturalistic Philosophy Proved Difficult
The naturalistic interpretation provides superior explanatory power for this documented difficulty compared to traditional religious explanations. Religious teachings typically offer consolation, supernatural hope, and clear moral guidance—characteristics that make them readily accessible to popular understanding. Sophisticated naturalistic philosophy, by contrast, challenges fundamental assumptions about personal identity, death, and moral foundations in ways that require exceptional intellectual preparation to appreciate.
The no-self teaching exemplifies this difficulty. Ordinary experience provides overwhelming evidence for personal continuity through memory, bodily sensation, and social identity. Religious teachings typically validate this sense of selfhood while offering methods for its improvement or salvation. The Buddha’s analysis that careful investigation reveals “no permanent, unchanging essence” (anattā) contradicts both immediate experience and religious expectations.[45] Such teaching requires sophisticated phenomenological analysis to understand and sustained practice to verify experientially.
The naturalistic approach to death proves equally challenging. Universal human psychology includes profound death anxiety that motivates elaborate religious and philosophical systems promising survival or transcendence. Contemporary terror management theory has demonstrated the extent to which cultural worldviews function to provide symbolic immortality and buffer death anxiety.[46] The Buddha’s teaching that death represents natural completion rather than transition to continued existence directly contradicts these psychological needs while offering only rational acceptance as consolation.
The ethical implications create additional difficulties. If no permanent self exists and death represents natural completion, conventional moral systems based on personal desert and cosmic justice lose their foundations. Religious audiences expecting clear guidance about merit accumulation and karmic consequences would find naturalistic ethics based on present-moment psychological understanding inadequate for their spiritual needs. The teaching appears to eliminate moral foundations rather than providing superior religious guidance.
The epistemological challenge compounds these difficulties. The Buddha’s systematic rejection of traditional authority sources—views (diṭṭhi), learning (suta), and conventional knowledge (ñāṇa)—eliminates the external validation that most people require for philosophical positions.[47] The emphasis on individual investigation through direct experience places the burden of verification on personal effort rather than providing the communal validation that makes religious teachings appealing.
Social and political considerations add further complications. Brahmanical establishments had institutional interests in maintaining ritual authority and social hierarchy systems. Royal patronage typically preferred religious teachings that validated conventional moral order and provided cosmic legitimacy for political arrangements. The Buddha’s naturalistic philosophy, while not directly challenging political authority, failed to provide the religious validation that made teachers valuable to existing power structures.
Evidence of Misunderstanding and Reinterpretation
The canonical literature preserves extensive evidence that contemporaries struggled to categorize the Buddha’s position within conventional philosophical frameworks. The Brahmajāla Sutta describes how “eke samaṇabrāhmaṇā sassatavādā sassataṃ attānaṃ ca lokaṃ ca paññapenti”—”some ascetics and brahmins are eternalists who proclaim the self and the world to be eternal”—while others “ucchedavādā ucchedaṃ attānaṃ ca lokaṃ ca paññapenti”—”are annihilationists who proclaim the destruction of the self and the world.”[48] The Buddha’s position transcends both categories by rejecting the assumption that “self” represents an ultimate reality requiring either eternal preservation or ultimate destruction.
This classificatory difficulty led to systematic misunderstanding. Opponents frequently grouped the Buddha with materialist schools like the Lokāyata, as suggested by the Sāmaññaphala Sutta’s presentation of various philosophical positions.[49] The materialist emphasis on natural causation and rejection of afterlife speculation provided surface similarity to naturalistic Buddhism, but materialist schools typically lacked the sophisticated psychological analysis that distinguished the Buddha’s approach.
Followers faced equal difficulty distinguishing naturalistic ethics from crude hedonism. The Mahāparinibbāna Sutta preserves accounts of disciples struggling to understand how liberation could be achieved without supernatural intervention or future-life consequences.[50] The natural tendency would be to interpret teachings about “pleasure” (sukha) and “ending suffering” (dukkhanirodha) within conventional frameworks of sensual satisfaction rather than understanding the subtle psychological processes actually described.
The historical development of Buddhist doctrine provides clear evidence of systematic reinterpretation. Concepts that appear naturalistic in earliest sources become integrated with supernatural frameworks in later material. The term “kamma” initially described natural action and consequence but evolved into cosmic moral law governing rebirth. “Saṃsāra” originally meant psychological wandering but became cosmological cycle requiring multiple lifetimes to complete. “Nibbāna” described natural psychological peace but became transcendent reality achievable only through extensive religious practice across multiple rebirths.
This reinterpretation pattern parallels documented processes in other philosophical traditions. Stoic philosophy underwent similar transformation, with original naturalistic ethics becoming integrated with religious and mystical elements in later Neoplatonism. Chinese naturalistic philosophy evolved into religious Daoism with supernatural elements absent from original Daoist texts. The process appears to represent natural cultural evolution rather than corruption of original teachings.
The institutional pressures driving reinterpretation prove comprehensible when considered from sociological perspective. Small communities of sophisticated practitioners could maintain naturalistic interpretation through direct dialogue and mutual support. Larger communities seeking broader cultural integration required teachings accessible to popular understanding and compatible with conventional religious expectations. Educational institutions needed systematic doctrine suitable for formal transmission. Political patronage demanded religious legitimacy for social and moral authority.
The Abhidhamma literature represents the culmination of this systematization process. While preserving sophisticated psychological analysis that may reflect original naturalistic insights, it integrates this material with extensive cosmological and karmic frameworks absent from the earliest sources. The result provides comprehensive religious philosophy capable of competing with other Indian schools while obscuring the naturalistic foundations that may have characterized the original teaching.
Part IV: Philosophical Reconstruction and Implications
The Original Naturalistic System
Based on convergent evidence from textual analysis, historical contextualization, and philosophical reconstruction, we can outline the probable characteristics of the Buddha’s original naturalistic teaching with considerable confidence. This system appears to have focused on practical methods for achieving psychological liberation through rational understanding of natural processes, particularly human psychology and mortality.
The epistemological foundation emphasized empirical investigation over external authority. The principle “sandiṭṭhikam akālikaṃ”—visible here-and-now, not a matter of time—established present-moment verification as the criterion for valid teaching.[51] This methodology parallels scientific empiricism while focusing on subjective psychological processes rather than external physical phenomena. The systematic rejection of views (diṭṭhi), learning (suta), and conventional knowledge (ñāṇa) as sources of wisdom eliminated external validation while emphasizing individual investigation through careful attention to experience.[52]
The psychological theory centered on analysis of the “three characteristics” (tilakkhana) observable in all conditioned phenomena: impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha), and not-self (anattā).[53] Crucially, these appear to have been presented as empirical observations rather than religious doctrines. Careful investigation of mental and physical processes reveals constant change, the psychological dissatisfaction arising from resistance to change, and the absence of any permanent, unchanging essence requiring preservation or salvation.
This analysis provided naturalistic foundations for ethics and liberation. Recognizing impermanence eliminates attachment to fixed identities and possessions that create psychological conflict. Accepting the absence of a permanent self prevents ego-driven behavior that generates suffering for oneself and others. Understanding mortality as natural completion rather than tragic interruption reduces death anxiety and enables present-moment focus rather than anxious future planning.
The liberation theory appears to have described psychological freedom achievable through rational understanding rather than supernatural attainment. “Nibbāna” likely described the natural peace arising when psychological conflict ends through accepting impermanence and mortality.[54] This state could be verified through direct experience and sustained through continued practice, but required no metaphysical commitments about transcendent realities or cosmic salvation.
The ethical framework operated through rational understanding of consequences rather than divine command or karmic mechanism. Harmful behavior creates psychological conflict through reinforcing ego-identification and generating social discord. Beneficial behavior supports psychological peace through expressing non-attachment and promoting community harmony. The motivation for ethical conduct emerges through understanding rather than fear of punishment or hope for reward.
The social teaching emphasized community cooperation for practical support of individual liberation efforts. The early saṅgha appears to have functioned as philosophical community rather than religious institution, providing education, mutual support, and cultural validation for naturalistic lifestyle. The teaching proved universally applicable across social boundaries while requiring no institutional mediation for individual practice.
This reconstructed system demonstrates remarkable coherence and explanatory power while remaining consistent with the earliest textual evidence. The sophisticated integration of psychological analysis, ethical philosophy, and practical methodology suggests advanced intellectual development rather than primitive religious expression. The naturalistic foundations provide rational basis for contemplative practice while avoiding supernatural commitments that create additional sources of psychological conflict.
Comparison with Later Religious Developments
The contrast between this original naturalistic system and later religious Buddhism proves dramatic across multiple dimensions. Where the original teaching emphasized present-life verification, later Buddhism developed elaborate afterlife cosmologies requiring faith rather than direct experience. Where naturalistic psychology focused on observable mental processes, religious psychology incorporated supernatural elements like consciousness transfer between lifetimes and karmic mechanisms governing moral desert across multiple rebirths.
The soteriological frameworks diverged even more significantly. Original naturalistic liberation appears to have described psychological peace achievable through understanding mortality and impermanence. Later religious liberation became escape from rebirth cycles through accumulation of karmic merit and elimination of spiritual defilements across extensive periods of religious practice. The practical accessibility of naturalistic liberation transformed into remote religious goal requiring exceptional devotion and institutional support.
The epistemological methods evolved from empirical investigation toward scriptural authority and traditional interpretation. Where the original teaching systematically rejected external validation sources, later Buddhism developed elaborate commentarial literature providing authoritative interpretation of increasingly systematized doctrine. Individual investigation became subordinated to community consensus and institutional teaching authority.
The ethical foundations shifted from rational understanding of natural consequences toward cosmic moral law governing rebirth destinations. Naturalistic ethics based on present-moment psychological effects became supplemented and eventually dominated by karmic theories promising future-life rewards and punishments. The practical motivation for ethical behavior through understanding interconnectedness became overshadowed by self-interested calculation of karmic benefits.
The community structure evolved from philosophical dialogue toward religious institution. The early saṅgha’s apparent function as educational community supporting individual investigation became systematized into monastic institution requiring formal ordination, hierarchical authority, and elaborate ritual observances. The universal accessibility of naturalistic practice became mediated through institutional membership and clerical guidance.
This transformation pattern proves comprehensible through documented sociological processes affecting other philosophical traditions. Small communities of sophisticated practitioners can maintain complex intellectual positions through direct dialogue and mutual correction. Larger institutions serving diverse populations require simplified presentations accessible to varying educational levels. Political patronage and economic support create pressures for conventional religious legitimacy rather than challenging philosophical innovation.
The preservation of naturalistic elements within later religious frameworks provides evidence for historical stratification rather than alternative religious interpretation. Sophisticated psychological analysis continues within Abhidhamma literature despite integration with cosmological speculation. Empirical meditation instructions maintain practical effectiveness despite theoretical embedding within karmic and rebirth frameworks. Original naturalistic insights remain accessible to contemporary practitioners willing to distinguish historical layers from later interpretive overlay.
Contemporary Implications and Applications
The naturalist Buddha hypothesis carries profound implications extending far beyond academic historical revision. If the evidence supports naturalistic interpretation, it provides historical legitimacy for secular contemplative approaches that have emerged independently across cultures while revealing one of humanity’s earliest and most sophisticated examples of naturalistic philosophy applied to psychological healing and human flourishing.
For Buddhist studies, the implications prove revolutionary. Traditional approaches assuming religious foundations would require fundamental reorientation toward historical and philosophical rather than theological methods. The systematic application of textual criticism, comparative philosophy, and cultural analysis would become standard methodology rather than supplementary technique. The field could achieve full academic legitimacy while maintaining appreciation for the profound practical wisdom preserved within traditional frameworks.
For contemporary Buddhist practice, the naturalistic interpretation provides multiple benefits. Secular practitioners could engage traditional meditation techniques and ethical teachings with historical confidence rather than requiring uncomfortable separation of practical methods from religious beliefs. Traditional practitioners could appreciate deeper foundations for their religious commitment while understanding historical development processes that transformed original naturalistic insights into religious frameworks.
The implications for philosophy of religion prove equally significant. The naturalistic Buddha demonstrates that sophisticated contemplative spirituality requires no supernatural commitments while achieving practical results comparable to traditional religious approaches. This historical precedent supports contemporary movements toward naturalistic spirituality while providing ancient wisdom about psychological liberation through rational acceptance of mortality and impermanence.
More broadly, the hypothesis contributes to understanding how sophisticated philosophical positions become transformed into religious systems through cultural transmission processes. The documented evolution from naturalistic philosophy to religious institution provides case study for similar processes in other traditions while illuminating the social and psychological factors that drive religious development.
For cross-cultural philosophy, the naturalistic interpretation reveals extensive connections between Buddhist insight and broader Axial Age rational developments. The systematic parallels with Greek philosophy, the shared Indo-European conceptual heritage, and the similar approaches to death anxiety and ethical foundations suggest that human rational capacity produced comparable solutions to fundamental existential questions across multiple cultures during this crucial period of intellectual development.
The practical applications prove equally significant. Contemporary psychotherapy increasingly incorporates contemplative techniques derived from Buddhist sources while maintaining scientific methodology and naturalistic assumptions. The historical legitimacy provided by the naturalist Buddha hypothesis supports this integration while offering ancient precedent for rational approaches to psychological healing.
Educational implications extend across multiple disciplines. Philosophy courses could include naturalistic Buddhism within broader treatment of ancient philosophy rather than relegating Buddhist thought to religious studies. Psychology programs could examine early Buddhist psychological analysis as historical precedent for scientific investigation of mental processes. Religious studies could analyze Buddhist development as case study in religious evolution while maintaining appreciation for both naturalistic foundations and religious elaborations.
The environmental implications deserve particular attention. Contemporary ecological crises require fundamental changes in human attitudes toward mortality, consumption, and long-term thinking. The naturalistic Buddha’s emphasis on accepting impermanence, reducing attachment to material accumulation, and understanding interdependence provides historical wisdom directly relevant to contemporary sustainability challenges.
Conclusion: The Revolutionary Transformation of Understanding
This investigation has assembled compelling evidence from multiple independent methodologies pointing toward a revolutionary reinterpretation of Buddhist origins. The convergent testimony of textual stratification, cross-cultural philosophical parallels, historical contextualization, and rational explanation creates a cumulative case that transcends the limitations of any single approach while meeting the evidentiary standards required for historical claims of this magnitude.
The textual evidence proves particularly compelling. The complete absence of karma and rebirth references from the earliest Buddhist strata, combined with systematic naturalistic philosophical content in the Aṭṭhakavagga and Pārāyanavagga, suggests original teaching focused on present-life psychological liberation through rational acceptance of mortality and impermanence. The documented evolution of these concepts through later textual layers provides clear evidence for historical development rather than thematic variation within unified religious system.
The philosophical parallels with contemporary Axial Age rationalism prove equally significant. The extensive similarities with Greek naturalistic philosophy, particularly in approaches to death anxiety and psychological liberation, suggest shared intellectual context rather than religious isolation. The sophisticated integration of rational methodology with practical psychology represents one of humanity’s earliest achievements in naturalistic philosophy rather than primitive religious expression.
The historical difficulties documented in canonical sources provide additional supporting evidence. The systematic testimony that teachings proved “hard to see” and “comprehensible only to the wise” aligns precisely with expectations for sophisticated naturalistic philosophy while challenging conventional religious interpretation. The documented struggles with classification and understanding reflect the intellectual challenges posed by naturalistic position that transcended conventional religious and philosophical categories.
The explanatory power of the naturalist hypothesis proves superior to traditional religious interpretation across multiple dimensions. It accounts for textual patterns, historical development, philosophical sophistication, and contemporary resonance in ways that religious interpretation cannot match while avoiding the theological commitments that compromise academic objectivity in traditional Buddhist studies.
Yet this investigation acknowledges the necessarily inferential nature of historical reconstruction and the legitimate scholarly caution required for claims of this magnitude. The temporal gap between proposed historical figure and complete textual sources necessitates careful interpretation rather than definitive conclusion. Alternative explanations deserve continued examination even as evidence accumulates supporting naturalistic interpretation.
The implications prove profound regardless of final scholarly consensus. If correct, the naturalist Buddha hypothesis would represent one of the most significant discoveries in the history of religious and philosophical studies. If incorrect, the investigation still demonstrates the value of systematic historical methodology and cross-cultural philosophical analysis while contributing to more sophisticated understanding of Buddhist development processes.
The contemporary relevance proves undeniable. In an era characterized by increasing tension between scientific naturalism and religious commitment, the naturalist Buddha provides historical precedent for sophisticated contemplative spirituality requiring no supernatural beliefs while achieving practical results validated through direct experience. This ancient wisdom about psychological liberation through rational acceptance of mortality and impermanence speaks directly to contemporary human needs while honoring the profound insights of our philosophical ancestors.
The path forward requires continued research across multiple disciplines. Systematic textual stratification analysis throughout the Pali canon could provide additional evidence for developmental patterns. Archaeological investigation of earliest Buddhist institutional sites could illuminate historical processes of community development. Expanded comparative analysis with other Axial Age traditions could reveal broader patterns of rational philosophical emergence.
Most importantly, the hypothesis opens new possibilities for engagement with Buddhist wisdom that transcend traditional boundaries between religious and secular approaches. Whether one approaches this material as historical Buddhist, contemporary secular practitioner, academic philosopher, or simply curious human being seeking practical wisdom about mortality and flourishing, the naturalist Buddha offers resources for understanding and practice that remain as relevant today as they were twenty-five centuries ago.
The figure emerging from this investigation—a sophisticated naturalistic philosopher developing systematic methods for psychological liberation through rational understanding of human nature—represents one of humanity’s greatest intellectual achievements. The recovery of this vision from beneath layers of religious interpretation provides invaluable resources for contemporary human flourishing while demonstrating the profound capacity for wisdom that emerges when rational investigation combines with compassionate concern for reducing suffering and promoting human welfare.
The revolution in understanding has indeed begun. Whether it culminates in fundamental transformation of Buddhist studies, broader appreciation for naturalistic contemplative wisdom, or simply enriched dialogue between religious and secular approaches to human flourishing, this investigation demonstrates that our ancient philosophical heritage contains resources for contemporary challenges that we are only beginning to appreciate. The naturalist Buddha awaits rediscovery by each generation willing to engage this profound wisdom with the intellectual honesty and practical commitment it deserves.
Bibliography
Primary Sources (Pali Canon)
Sutta Piṭaka:
- Dīghanikāyo Mahāvaggapāḷi. Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series. Colombo: Government Press, 1957-1993.
- Majjhimanikāyo Mūlapaṇṇāsapāḷi. Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series. Colombo: Government Press, 1957-1993.
- Saṃyuttanikāyo Mahāvaggapāḷi. Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series. Colombo: Government Press, 1957-1993.
- Suttanipātapāḷi. Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series. Colombo: Government Press, 1957-1993.
Commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā):
- Sumaṅgalavilāsinī: Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā. 3 volumes. Edited by T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter. London: Pali Text Society, 1886-1932.
- Papañcasūdanī: Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā. 3 volumes. Edited by J.H. Woods and D. Kosambi. London: Pali Text Society, 1922-1938.
- Paramatthajotikā: Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā. 2 volumes. Edited by Helmer Smith. London: Pali Text Society, 1916-1917.
Modern Scholarship
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000.
Bronkhorst, Johannes. Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Gombrich, Richard F. How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. London: Athlone Press, 1996.
Jaspers, Karl. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by Michael Bullock. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
Norman, K.R. A Philological Approach to Buddhism. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1997.
Warder, A.K. Indian Buddhism. 3rd revised edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000.
Comparative Philosophy
Freeman, Kathleen. Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.
Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 volumes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Notes
[1] Suttanipāta 1080: “Accī yathā vātavegena khittā, atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ.”
[2] Norman, K.R. A Philological Approach to Buddhism, pp. 78-95.
[3] Suttanipāta 772-773.
[4] Suttanipāta 793.
[5] Suttanipāta 837.
[6] Suttanipāta 855.
[7] Suttanipāta 806.
[8] Suttanipāta 806.
[9] Suttanipāta 847-858.
[10] Suttanipāta 1084.
[11] Suttanipāta 1084.
[12] Suttanipāta 1080.
[13] Suttanipāta 1081.
[14] Suttanipāta 1082.
[15] Suttanipāta 1085-1086.
[16] Suttanipāta 1088.
[17] Suttanipāta 735.
[18] Suttanipāta 748.
[19] Suttanipāta 759.
[20] Suttanipāta 229, 238, 247.
[21] Jaspers, Karl. The Origin and Goal of History, pp. 1-21.
[22] Compare Heraclitus DK 22 B30 with standard Buddhist formulation in Dīgha Nikāya 16.
[23] Heraclitus DK 22 B62.
[24] Heraclitus DK 22 B107.
[25] Suttanipāta 1143.
[26] Democritus DK 68 B125.
[27] Diogenes Laertius 7.87.
[28] Epictetus, Discourses 3.24.28.
[29] Watkins, Calvert. How to Kill a Dragon: Aspects of Indo-European Poetics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
[30] Mallory, J.P. and D.Q. Adams. Encyclopedia of Indo-European Culture. London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997, pp. 299-300.
[31] Encyclopedia of Indo-European Culture, pp. 332-333.
[32] Schmitt, Rüdiger. The Bisitun Inscription of Darius the Great. London: Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum, 1991.
[33] Cardona, George. Pāṇini: A Survey of Research. The Hague: Mouton, 1976.
[34] See especially Majjhima Nikāya 60 (Apaṇṇaka Sutta) and Dīgha Nikāya 2 (Sāmaññaphala Sutta).
[35] Suttanipāta 684.
[36] Dīgha Nikāya 2.
[37] Dīgha Nikāya 2.55.
[38] Dīgha Nikāya 2.56.
[39] Jaini, Padmanabh S. The Jaina Path of Purification. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, pp. 104-120.
[40] Olivelle, Patrick, trans. Upaniṣads. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
[41] Erdosy, George. Urbanisation in Early Historic India. Oxford: British Archaeological Reports, 1988.
[42] Dīgha Nikāya 1.28.
[43] Majjhima Nikāya 67.
[44] Majjhima Nikāya 121.
[45] The standard formulation appears throughout the Saṃyutta Nikāya, e.g., 22.85-87.
[46] Becker, Ernest. The Denial of Death. New York: Free Press, 1973.
[47] Suttanipāta 1084.
[48] Dīgha Nikāya 1.14-16.
[49] Dīgha Nikāya 2.55-58.
[50] Dīgha Nikāya 16.
[51] Suttanipāta 1143.
[52] Suttanipāta 1084.
[53] The three characteristics are systematically presented throughout the Saṃyutta Nikāya, particularly in the Khandha Saṃyutta.
[54] The etymology and early usage of “nibbāna” supports this interpretation; see Norman, A Philological Approach to Buddhism, pp. 38-45.
